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A FIRST-HAND REPORT ON RED CHINA TODAY

Interview With a Chinese Who Grew Up Under Communism

Behind the turmoil in Red China—

Are the Communists riding for a fall? Is their tight control slipping? What do China's millions really think of their rulers?

A vivid picture of today's China emerges from this interview with a Communist defector, Miao Chen-pai. He has only boyhood memories of

China before the Reds. But his knowledge of his homeland since is sharp and perceptive.

Miao Chen-pai, now in the United States, was interviewed by two members of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report" who have lived in China. Both were struck by his intelligent, objective answers to their questions.

Q Mr. Miao, where were you and what were you doing when the Communists came to power in China in 1949?

A I was living with my parents about three hours' train ride from Shanghai. I was 13 then. My parents were both schoolteachers. I was in school.

Q As a 13-year-old boy, what did you think of the Communists and Mao Tse-tung?

A Mao Tse-tung was a hero to me. I believed in him, and in the Communists. I believed their ideas were right and good for China, so later I joined the Communist Party.

Q How long did you continue to believe?


A For many years. That's why I went on to join the Communist Party. I could see some things that were good for my country. Conditions improved for the lowest of the peasants—the ones who never owned any land. The country was unified, too—brought under one Government.

Q What advantages do you get by being a member of the Communist Party?

A We don't get any immediate material advantages from being a member of the party. A party member, for example, gets the same pay as a nonparty member doing the same job. But all Chinese know that, in the long run, the party member does benefit.

Nobody talks about this, but we can see it. Party members are promoted faster, move up to higher jobs. Of course, as you move up the ladder, you get better living quarters

MIAO CHEN-PAI, 29, joined China's Young Communist League in 1949 and the Communist Party itself in 1956. He was in China's armed forces from 1950 until 1957. Then he went to work for the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Last year, Mr. Miao was assigned by the Communists to the commercial mission of the Chinese Embassy in Damascus, Syria. It was there that he walked into the U. S. Embassy last July 26, asked for political asylum and got it.



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and better food. So, if you want to get ahead faster, you try to get into the party.

Q Why don't people talk about this?

A You don't like to talk about anything like that in China. For example, students in the universities are not only graded for their work, but also are graded for their loyalty. The party does the grading on loyalty. So, if the party committee at your university hears that you have said something that sounds disloyal, that is put in your record when you graduate. This is bad for you, because it means you are sent to an unsatisfactory job or to some faraway place. All students know this, so they try to show how loyal they are.

Q When did you, Mr. Miao, begin to have doubts about Mao Tse-tung and the Communists—and why?

A Almost all Chinese trusted Mao Tse-tung, thought of him as being almost infallible, until 1957. They believed him when he said he wanted a hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred thoughts to contend. Because they trusted him, many expressed their ideas and criticisms.

Then we found out that the "hundred flowers" was a trap. Mao Tse-tung used this trap to get people to tell their thoughts. In this way, Mao Tse-tung found out who opposed him—and got rid of these people.

Still, many people continued to believe in Mao Tse-tung. They said the trap had been a smart move by him—to get rid of people who were bourgeois and antiparty.

Personally, my doubts began in 1959, when it became obvious to me and others that the "Great Leap Forward"—a creation of Mao—was a failure. Then, afterward, Mao never criticized himself for this error—although he had always said that members of the party should criticize themselves.

Then, when Marshal Peng Teh-huai [former Defense Minister] was purged for criticizing Mao's "Great Leap Forward," I realized that Mao would not criticize himself, nor would he accept the criticism of others. Instead, he blamed others for the failure.

This strengthened my doubts. Not only did Mao Tse-tung refuse to accept criticism, but he also was trying to make himself appear infallible, a man who could make no error.

Q Did others feel this way? Did people talk about it?

A I am certain many people felt this way. But nobody talked about it. We were afraid. Ever since the trap of the hundred flowers, we Chinese keep our discontent in our hearts. We are afraid to speak of these things to each other.

Q Then how can you be certain others felt this way?

A It came out later, in the last few years. It came out in literary work. It came out in criticisms by economic people and the educated classes. It came out even inside the party—which is why you now see the purges and the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

Q How did you learn about these events inside the party in China while you were in Syria?

A Beginning last May, while I still was in the Embassy in Damascus, our Ambassador received orders from Peking to implement the cultural revolution. Peking began sending him a number of documents on the situation in China. These were studied and discussed in long sessions held every day in the Embassy.

Some of the documents and reports were shown only to the relatively few Communist Party members in the Embassy. As a party member, I was shown these documents.

From them, I learned what happened to Peng Chen.

Peng Chen was one of the six most-powerful men in the Politburo of the Communist Party—the mayor of Peking, the capital, and also head of the party organization there. The documents showed that he was removed primarily because he was anti-Mao.

In September of 1963, Peng Chen made statements at a national meeting of provincial propaganda workers. The statements were considered anti-Mao. What Peng Chen said was that everyone should be given freedom to speak—and that, even if it is Chairman Mao who is wrong, he, too, must be criticized.

Mao Tse-tung no doubt has made many errors, but as long as he retains power, no one will be allowed to criticize him. Peng was purged a few months later.

Q Peng and others must have known the risks they were taking when they dared to criticize Mao. Why did they do it?

A Peng and other high leaders in the party and the military have their own followers. I don't know, but it may have been that they felt strong enough, politically, to voice their opinions.

But this I do know: The reason for the existence of widespread opposition to Chairman Mao's policies is the many setbacks the country has suffered. Both domestically and in the field of foreign relations, the policies of Mao have not succeeded. But these policies have no chance of being changed so long as Mao Tse-tung is alive, and so long as anyone who questions the policies is purged.

Q Do you believe, Mr. Miao, that the purges and mobs of young Red Guards will make everyone obedient to Mao Tse-tung now?

A No, I don't. As long as Mao's policies are followed, whether by Mao himself or by his successors, there will be opposition. There are other groups besides the Mao Tse-tung group. As I said, Peng Chen had many followers, and many of these have not been purged. There are groups in the military, too. As long as there are groups who believe that Mao Tse-tung's policies are wrong for China, the struggle will continue.

Q What in your mind are the main policies of Mao that are causing the problems?

A There are two main policies: At home, there is the policy of continued class struggle; abroad, there is the policy of world revolution.

Q Are these policies popular?

A I don't think so. The class struggle at home means continuing war against the *bourgeoisie* and the people with bourgeois thoughts. Chinese suspected of having bourgeois thoughts are those who are not opposed to the *bourgeoisie*.

As for world revolution, I don't think the Chinese are enthusiastic or very much interested. They are more interested in getting a better life for themselves. They do not like to make sacrifices to help "liberate" people far away. People ask why we have to send help to foreign "liberation movements" when we don't have enough money for our own development.

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... "Thought control is hated. People are unhappy"

Q What do the Chinese think they should have to make their lives better?

A Personal freedom is the main thing. Thought control is hated. People are unhappy with the way Communism is breaking up traditional family life. They want time in the evening to spend with their families—instead of attending study groups and self-criticism meetings and listening to propaganda lectures. People want time for themselves.

Q What do they think of things like the law against marriage before a fairly advanced age?

A The law isn't too bad. It says men can marry at age 20 and women at age 18. But the party says men shouldn't marry until they are 27, and women until they are 25. And you must understand that, in China, what the party says is more important than the law. So, generally, in the cities, men don't marry until they are 27. In the countryside, however, more people get married earlier—following the law rather than the party.

Q Chinese propaganda also discourages sexual relations before marriage. Is this accepted?

A Many people do accept this. They work hard, practice self-restraint. But many people do not obey—particularly in the universities. You never hear about it in China, but there are a great many babies born out of wedlock.

Q How effective is the party propaganda in China?

A Very effective. Remember, we hear nothing from the outside world that the party doesn't want us to hear. As a result, Mao Tse-tung has been able to make the Chinese believe one thing at one time, and just the opposite at another time.

In 1956, for example, Mao Tse-tung told us that Russia was the great leader and teacher of the revolution. Then a few years later, after Khrushchev had gone to Camp David to see Eisenhower, he made us believe that Khrushchev no longer was a Marxist-Leninist, and Russia no longer was the leader of the revolution.

AS MAO'S TROUBLES GROW—

Q Well, if Mao's propaganda is that effective, why does he now need the cultural revolution and the Red Guards and the purges of party leaders?

A Mao Tse-tung needs all this because of the opposition that has developed to his policies—and because of his failures. He started the cultural revolution because of this opposition. Then he found that many members of the Young Communist League were not supporting the cultural revolution, or were not enthusiastic.

So then he had to turn to the Red Guards. These are the younger people, who are most easily swayed and controlled by the propaganda.

Q Who are the Red Guards? How did they get started?

A The Red Guards started in the universities in Peking. That was well after the cultural revolution had been started.

At first, the Red Guards were not publicly formed in the name of the party. The party element behind Mao and Marshal Lin Biao wanted it to appear that the Red Guards had been formed by student leaders in the universities. But, in fact, the Red Guards were backed, instructed and developed by this element of the party.

Q Do you think the Red Guards can be controlled—or that they might turn out to be some kind of "Frankenstein monster" and turn on their creators?

A I don't think it is possible that they will get out of control, like a "Frankenstein monster." That is because Mao and Lin have created them, would make sure to have means of control over them. Chinese Communist Party leaders have had great experience in creating and stopping such movements, you know.

Q Is the present situation connected, in any way with the results of the break with Soviet Russia?

A I don't think it is, in the minds of the people.

When it became realized that there was a break, people were happy, in a way. Now, they thought, China can show the world that it can progress on its own, without help. We Chinese had confidence that we could progress on our own, although we realized it would take longer. But we felt that the accomplishment would be more satisfying, because it would be ours.

Besides, there was dissatisfaction with the type of help Russia was giving us. Engineers told me that the automobile plant the Russians helped us build in Changchun was not good. I didn't see the Russian plants myself, but many people who did told me the same kind of story.

"CHINA CAN PUSH AHEAD"—

Q Can China, in fact, progress on its own?

A I think China basically can push ahead economically. Of course, China is still economically weak. Because of this, she hopes to supplement her own technological and scientific capabilities with the technological and scientific capabilities of the Western countries.

She is seeking to do this now by developing her foreign trade with these countries. Though she has shown she can do things on her own—the atom bomb, for example—China has a long way to go, still, in many, many fields. Such things as bombs, of course, are not everything. China in recent years has refused development aid from Russia, and there have been no new developments or changes on this.

I don't believe China needs aid from Russia or anybody else. As a matter of national pride, and because China is a vast country and full of resources, I believe China can do it on her own—though it will take time. And, of course, she needs to develop her foreign trade in order to strengthen herself economically and technologically.

Q What will be the effects of the development of a nuclear-carrying missile which Communist China has just announced?

A I don't believe it will have any actual military worth, but it can elevate China's influence and be of use to her in a propaganda way for prestige.

I think the reaction of the Chinese people will be pride, just as they were proud that China had an atom bomb.

Q Is there any sentiment of importance in favor of Chiang Kai-shek's coming back from Taiwan?

A Older people might like to see Chiang come back. Others might want the personal liberties that they now believe existed under the Nationalist Government. But the young people know hardly anything about Chiang and the Nationalists—except what the Communists tell them.

Q Is there any man or group who appears to the Chinese to give hope of restoring the personal liberties they want?

A I know of no specific person or group, but the people do long for personal freedom. So, eventually, maybe the people will be able to find such a man or group for themselves.

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... "The U.S. is the enemy in the popular mind"

Many, particularly the older people, long for the old ways and customs. I'll give you an example:

A few years ago, Mao Tse-tung ordered the whole Peking Opera changed. This was the great opera of China. The songs were familiar, and many people loved them. Mao Tse-tung changed the opera so that it would do songs that help the revolution. One day, in a barber shop in Peking, I heard an older man ask the barber to please turn off the radio while it was playing one of the new songs of the opera. The barber did.

Q How would you describe the kind of personal liberties that the Chinese want?

A There are many different kinds, depending on who the individual Chinese is and where he is. A peasant wants to own his own land. A worker wants to be free to enjoy his time off work. A writer wants to be free to put down his own thoughts—to criticize if he feels strongly about something.

What it amounts to, I guess, is the kind of revisionism they have in Russia and Eastern Europe, although this I did not realize until after I left China.

The material shortages bother the Chinese people. But many people live just about as they did before. Some—the lower peasants—may live a little better than before.

But it is the spiritual oppression that is hated most—the thought control, the control of your time.

Q How tight is political control from the party headquarters in Peking?

A It is extremely tight. Whenever provincial party leaders get out of line, people are sent out from Peking to straighten them out. This happened in Anhwei and in other provinces.

Now the Red Guards are being used against some of the provincial party headquarters.

Q What do the Chinese people generally feel about the American people now? Are we the hated enemy, or would they like to make friends again?

A I am sorry to say that the U. S. is the hated enemy in the popular mind as a result of the propaganda. I do not feel that they particularly fear the U. S.—and this, also, is the result of propaganda.

It is hard for foreigners to understand this if they have never lived under such a system. Ever since 1950, the propaganda against the United States has been never-ceasing. After being subjected to such cleverly devised propaganda day after day for 15 years, the human mind can't help but be affected by it.

CHANCES OF WAR WITH U. S.—

Q What about the war? What would make the Chinese enter the fighting in Vietnam?

A We Chinese do not feel that the party wants war with the United States. I personally never felt we were going to war in 1958 over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

I cannot say now what would force the party to decide to fight in Vietnam. Once the party said China would go to war if Hanoi was bombed. But Hanoi was bombed, and China did not go to war.

Maybe China would go to war if American ground troops invaded North Vietnam and moved too close to the Chinese border. But I am not even sure of that. It isn't like Korea. There, the party feared that the Americans would threaten the Chinese industries just north of the Yalu River.

I think China might enter the war if the whole regime of Ho Chi Minh were threatened, but I don't know.

Q In your view, what is the main danger that Communist China now presents to its neighbors?

A I can't say what the danger is to any other neighboring country now, except for Vietnam. There, the Chinese Communist Government policy is to prevent any peace negotiations. There are two reasons:

First, Chinese Communist foreign policies are in conflict with Soviet foreign policies. Therefore, the Chinese Communists, by pushing their foreign-policy ideas in Vietnam, hope to win an ideological victory over the Soviets.

Second, the Chinese Communists hope to expand Communism throughout Southeast Asia through successes in Vietnam. The Vietnam war, therefore, is the basic key to Mao's whole theory of world revolution and wars of "national liberation." He wants victory in Vietnam because that would be taken as evidence that he is right and Russia is wrong. But, if the United States can bring about negotiations for peace, he loses.

South Vietnam is not Mao's whole goal. It is the key to Communist expansion generally. So Mao will try every possibility to prevent peace.

WHY COLLAPSE IS UNLIKELY—

Q Where does China go from here? Is it headed for internal collapse, for example?

A So far, I haven't seen anything to indicate that an internal collapse is coming to China. But, inside China, there are a lot of contradictions, and these contradictions are sharpening. The main one is the desire of the people for more freedom.

After a period of time—how long, I really couldn't guess—this might bring about a trend toward something like revisionism and changes in China. But, so far, I really see no basis for believing internal collapse is coming.

Q Is there a chance that China will break up into semi-autonomous regional governments or regimes?

A I see no possibility of this, because the power of the Central Government—Mao and his group—is simply too strong, too ironclad.

China won't go back into the old system of war lords. And I don't think there will be semiautonomous regional governments set up. We had them, you know, even under Communism. It wasn't until 1954 that Mao Tse-tung was able to break the hold that some party groups had over various regions.

But what you are more likely to see develop is political divisions among various groups. We already have had that—which is why we now have the purges and the cultural revolution.

Q In your personal opinion, what is the best course China could take?

A This is a very difficult question.

My personal view of revisionism is that it is the period of transformation from a socialist system to a capitalist system. You see, Marx himself told how to carry on revolution against capitalism, but he never explained a specific way to build socialism.

All over the world there are people who say they are Marxists, and many are trying to build socialism. But Russia itself, after almost 50 years, has reverted to revisionism, and this, to my mind, is evidence of the failure of socialism.

So, up to now, I don't know how to build socialism in China, and I don't know who does.

Also, I don't see how anybody can deny that modern

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Red Chinese Defector Offers a Fresh View Of Peking Mood, Aims

Former Official and Party Member Doubts Regime Is Poised for New Clashes

Hobbled by Limited Resources

By PHILIP GEYELIN
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

While Red China writhes under the whip and words of Mao and the Johnson Administration shudders over the grandiose global designs of Mao's heir-apparent, Lin Piao, U.S. officials are getting some fresh, and in some ways conflicting, impressions of mainland China, and its real menace, from a man named Miao.

The full name is Miao Chen-pai. And while he is a nobody in the Peking hierarchy, he is currently a very hot article indeed within what is loosely called the U.S. "intelligence community." Reason: As recently as six months ago, Mr. Miao was, by his account, a loyal Communist Chinese bureaucrat, dutifully employed as a "foreign aid" official in Damascus with the assignment of promoting world revolution, in keeping with the doctrine of Lin Piao.

About then, however, Mr. Miao began to sour on Mr. Mao. As he tells it, on July 26, he waited until all his colleagues in the Red Chinese chancellery had stepped across to the embassy for lunch, then reached over his bed for a suitcase surreptitiously packed in advance, walked out the door and, five breathless minutes later, walked into the American embassy.

He thus became, by U.S. intelligence standards, probably the most important Communist Chinese defector yet to fall into American hands. Though refugees cross regularly into British-controlled Hong Kong, few are government officials. A mixed assortment of Red Chinese have defected to the U.S. in recent years, including a cook, an acrobat and a piano player. But the last government official to seek U.S. asylum was a low-ranking language expert and non-party member, who defected in Burundi more than two years ago.

Intensive U.S. Quizzing

By contrast, Miao Chen-pai was a party member of 10 years standing. This, and the fact that he is fluent in Arabic, placed him frequently at the right hand of his ambassador in Syria and kept him in close touch with the party line as well as with government policy during the year he spent in the Damascus embassy. Finally, his American custodians consider him not only the highest-ranking but much the most intelligent Chinese government defector yet to become available for prolonged and leisurely interrogation by U.S. authorities. Indeed, Mr. Miao, comfortably ensconced in an apartment in Washington, is still the subject of intensive quizzing, fully eight weeks after his bolt from the Damascus embassy.

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Mr. Miao, in short, is rated a rare and unprized prize, and well worth a two-day stay in the quiet of a hotel room over a glass of iced tea.

Slim, boyish in appearance, with close-cropped black hair and a ready grin, he looks closer to 19 than 29. Cautious at first and quick to concede the limits of his vantage point, he was understandably somewhat uncertain in his first long, detailed encounter with an American newsmen. Doubtless his responses were influenced, too, by the presence of official U.S. escorts, by a desire not to offend, and perhaps unconsciously by the line of questioning he had already been subjected to by U.S. authorities.

Though his English is surprisingly good, and an interpreter is needed only occasionally, he is still plainly mystified by many aspects of the world he has joined. "He hadn't the vaguest concept of geography outside China, and the Mideast," says one official. "He couldn't even guess the distance from San Francisco to Hong Kong."

One Man's Thinking

But Mr. Miao is nonetheless of strong mind about that slice of the world that he knew and elected to leave. So his observations are worth setting down, more or less as they spill forth, for what they tell of the thinking of a well-placed, intelligent and presumably disenchanted Red Chinese bureaucrat about the performance and the potential of Peking's policies.

In brief, the message from Miao cuts

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Methodical Red Defector Packs Dictionary, Suits

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

If you were a Red Chinese official, posted in a foreign country and planning to defect, what would you take with you and where would you turn?

Nothing but the clothes on your back, would seem to be the safest answer to the first question, and certainly not to the "wicked American imperialists," might seem a reasonable reply to the second. But not in the case of Miao Chen-pai, a young member of Peking's economic mission to Damascus, Syria—until last July 26. A prudent man, and proud, he slipped a Chinese-English dictionary and a transistor radio, two suits and four shirts into a suitcase, which rested on a shelf above his bed for fully a week before he saw his opportunity to make a break. And he headed straight for the U.S. embassy.

"I had always been told that the U.S. was the strongest country in the world so I decided the Americans would be best able to protect me," he explains. And he wanted to be as self-sufficient as possible, able to study English, find out independently what was being said about him and his exploit, especially in Peking, and wear his own clothes. In hotels, while en route to Washington, he even insisted on faithfully making his own bed, U.S. officials report.

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across what lately has seemed to be a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy—that Vietnam, as President Johnson put it the other day, is “the opening salvo in a series of bombardments, or as they are called in Peking, ‘wars of liberation.’” Quoting with evident approval from the London Economist, the President went on: “Until and unless there is solid evidence that China does not intend to do what Lin Piao says it wants to do or cannot do it (i.e., promote guerrilla wars in ‘the countryside of the world’—Asia, Africa and Latin America—by way of encircling and conquering the ‘cities of the world,’ meaning the U.S. and Europe) the only safe assumption . . . is that the Chinese mean every word they say.”

Without questioning that the Red Chinese ultimately may want to carry out this program, Mr. Miao, on his own experience, is doubtful that they can, at least any time soon. He is not even convinced that Lin Piao's celebrated declaration of a year ago does mean what it seems to mean or was meant for consumption outside the Communist world at all. “It is a theory for the long range,” he declares. “But it is not practical for now.”

A Substitute for Arms?

As Mr. Miao read it, Lin Piao was talking partly to the Russians—as part of the continuing Sino-Soviet debate over the relative merits of Soviet-style “peaceful co-existence” and Peking's professed intent to promote revolutionary war. Lin Piao's second purpose, according to Mr. Miao, was to give the Communist forces in Vietnam what he calls a “theoretical weapon,” presumably meaning a morale-building sense of mission. By this reasoning, Lin Piao's doctrine becomes not a global call to arms but a substitute for more Chinese arms in the Vietnamese struggle. Red Chinese help toward Vietnam's war of liberation right next door, by Mr. Miao's measurement, has been negligible.

“The war in Vietnam doesn't cost China anything,” he declares.

As Mr. Miao interprets his former government's policy, Peking would naturally be delighted if Communist forces prevailed in South Vietnam, for the sake of a victory in Red China's ideological dispute with Moscow, for the prestige loss the U.S. would suffer and for the impact this would have “on the leadership struggle” among Communist factions around the world. Failing victory, the last Mr. Miao heard directly of the Peking line, it was rigidly against a negotiated settlement. Instead, he says, the government in Peking wants “the war to drag on, to weaken the United States and cause increasing difficulties for the Americans within and outside their country.”

“As of July, my government wanted to continue the war in Vietnam, but not to join it,” says Mr. Miao.

There are ample reasons the Chinese might not wish to plunge more deeply into the struggle on behalf of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, not the least being fear of entanglement with the U.S. and exposure of China's limited war potential.

But beyond the military arena, Mr. Miao, who had served a stint as a Middle East specialist at home before being shipped out to Syria, pictures a highly flexible, pragmatic Chinese approach overall. Far from fostering guerrilla movements in pursuit of “pure,” Maoist revolution, Peking's practice has been to use its economic aid to curry political favor with non-Communist governments, even when such tactics might actually strengthen a government against possible Communist insurgency.

Contributing to this flexible approach and

influencing Red China's potential for global trouble-making, Mr. Miao strongly suggests, is China's limited capability for advancing its economic aims. (Last year, U.S. figures show, Communist China gave only \$59 million in credits and grants to less developed non-Communist countries, compared with over \$1.1 billion extended by Russia and its satellites.) Syria, where Mr. Miao was intimately involved in Peking's economic offensive for world influence, is a striking case in point.

Peking's aim in Damascus, as Mr. Miao understood it, was not to subvert Syria but to win influence for China and support for Chinese causes, to fan Syrian antagonism toward the West and, in all this, to outdo the Soviets. Not the least of the ironies in this approach, however, was that even if it worked part way and the Red Chinese managed to fan anti-Western feelings, the principal beneficiaries were probably the Soviets. For the Soviets could do for Syria what the Chinese could not—furnish the sort of splashy, “impact” aid, such as a sizable Soviet payment toward the cost of a dam on the Euphrates or railroad-building help, which Peking was simply incapable of furnishing.

“All we could do was offer light industry,” Mr. Miao declares. “And after I saw the light industry which the French had given Syria, it became clear that Syrian technology was better, or at least the equal of China's.”

The result was that a Communist Chinese credit granted to Syria in 1963, in the amount of 70 million Swiss francs (about \$16 million at today's exchange rate), was still untouched by May 1965. In 1964 experts from both countries exchanged visits; the Chinese showed plans for sugar refineries, textile mills, generator plants and other light industry. The Syrians were asked to make their selection.

“But there was no answer from the Syrians,” aidman Miao recalls. Why? “Probably because our choice was very limited, what the Syrians wanted we could not supply. Besides, they had more confidence in Europe. At least, that's the conclusion we reached in the embassy.”

Ultimately, a portion of the credit was used for the purchase of Chinese rice, and the Syrians urged that a further portion be applied to other regular Syrian imports from China. But the Chinese felt obliged to turn this down, on the ground that it would have adversely affected Red China's already adverse balance of payments with Syria, growing out of heavy Chinese purchases of Syrian cotton.

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In May of this year the Syrian Ministry of Industry finally put in orders for a small textile plant, a paper mill and some phosphate-mining equipment, to be charged against what remained of that three-year old credit, Mr. Miao reports. The last word he had was that Peking had okayed the textile plant but had told Syria it was unable to supply either the phosphate-mining gear or the paper factory.

The Red Chinese, in short, have not been buying much political favor in Syria, and part of the reason may be found in Mr. Miao's analysis of the fundamental Peking approach. For one thing, the Red Chinese refuse to bid competitively against the West; aid terms must be reached by negotiation. This naturally makes it impossible for the recipient to shop around for a better deal. Also, the Chinese refuse to engage in any joint ventures with other aid-giving countries, which tends to rule them out of really big projects even if lack of funds or high-quality equipment or materials did not. "The Chinese government does not wish to share the credit for its aid," says Mr. Miao. "They want it to be entirely Chinese."

This accent on a positive political return characterizes Red Chinese aid around the world. Emphasis is heavy on what are called "labor intensive" projects—meaning things like road-building that provide a pretext for bringing in large numbers of Red Chinese "technicians" to lend a hand. The tendency is strong, too, to turn off aid rapidly when no political pay-off results. When Cuba's Communists leaned hard in the direction of Moscow, for example, Peking suddenly could find no further need for buying Fidel Castro's sugar.

Also, effective foreign aid management may be further impeded by the fact that a fair proportion of the people officially listed as Peking's overseas aid representatives aren't really foreign aid men at all. Mr. Miao can't

swear to it, because it isn't the sort of thing one asks about, but "several" of his colleagues in the seven-man economic mission in Damascus struck him as lamentably untutored in matters economic.

"I think they were working for 'special agencies'," he declares. What made him think so was partly the fact that these men had separate filing cabinets, to which the others did not have access, and partly the need for the most careful coaching of these men whenever, for the sake of appearances, they did have to engage in economic palaver with the Syrians. "We used to have to, what do you say, brief them for hours, and then usually sit in with them in their business discussions," he recalls.

He guesses what they were really doing was collecting intelligence or "making propaganda, such as telling any Syrians they ran into what was wrong about your American 14 points for peace in Vietnam."

Syria's example, however, is not matched everywhere around the world. Though Chinese economic aid is only a fraction of that of the Soviet bloc or of the U.S., it has had some successes in lands such as Yemen, Mali or that part of present-day Tanzania which used to be the island of Zanzibar; the common denominator in most such instances is an economy measurably more backward than that of Red China itself.

"Syria was too progressive, too advanced," argues Mr. Miao.

In theory, of course, there may be more than enough countries in the world still sufficiently backward to provide fertile ground for Chinese "economic aid" as well as for Lin Piao's liberation wars.

But the impression Miao Chen-pai received, sitting in Damascus, was of a homeland torn by a host of what he calls "contradictions" and "conflicts," of a ruthless "cultural revolution" likely to preoccupy Peking's leaders "for a long time to come" and of a limit on resources that by itself would be bound to put a limit on how hard and how fast Red China can advance its revolutionary concepts even at home, let alone around the globe. It was an accumulation of such impressions, rather than any single incident, he says, that caused him to "doubt my country's policies" and begin thinking seriously, in about May of this year, of the big step he was to take in July.

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Chinese Defector Interviewed

Soviet Need of a Revolt Cited as Peking's View

By Flora Lewis

Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK—The Chinese Communists have told their Party members that the Soviet Union needs a new revolution, and only a revolution against Russia's "privileged classes" can permit a Moscow-Peking reconciliation. That is how a recent member of the Chinese Party was given to understand the daily sermons against revisionism.

The former member is Miao Chen-pai, a 29-year-old Chinese who left Peking's trade mission in Syria in July and went straight to the U.S. Embassy for refuge. He arrived

here last week. Miao had been a Communist for ten years and while he did not rank high enough to know the regime's secrets, he was privy to explanations made for Party members only, explanations which give some insight into Peking's public statements.

He discussed instructions he had received over the past year in an interview. If there was anything surprising in the difference between the inside and outside view of Peking's more belligerent statements, See DEFECTOR, A9, Col. 4

China Said to Feel Need of Soviet Revolution

it was that, according to Miao, bourgeois ideas. Peking considers Chinese Party members take the current Vietnam situation as a prime document presenting the pro-Tse-tung's guerrilla tactics for China. China hold equally true for the whole world.

This is how Miao's information from the Party led him to view some important Chinese policy developments:

On the Soviet Union—It is lumped indiscriminately with the United States, Japan, India and others as part of the anti-revolutionary camp. Peking's line is that the Soviet leadership rests on a "social base" of a privileged managerial group and therefore a change of personalities at the top could make little difference. Further, the line says, Peking's quarrel is with this group, not with the Russian people who must destroy the "privileged class" to return to the revolutionary fold.

An interesting sidelight on this subject was Miao's report that the favored foreign language schools in Chinese middle schools now is English. Students must choose either Russian or English. Five years ago, most took Russian.

On the United States — There is no contradiction between the "paper tiger" view of the United States and caution in dealing with American might. Short-term tactics require being careful about any confrontation with the United States, but long-term strategy sees America as intrinsically weak because of its own class structure and obsolete bourgeois

the world "cities" (industrialized states) was a prime document presenting the pro-Tse-tung's guerrilla tactics for the whole world.

It was not published as a warning to the West or Russia. That was an unavoidable concomitant in getting it to the audience for which it was designed—North Vietnam and the Vietcong in particular, all extreme revolutionary forces in general. The purpose was to strengthen and encourage these forces by providing them with a long-term doctrinal base, an article of faith to tide them over occasional setbacks and keep them fighting.

Communist reverses in such countries as Indonesia and Ghana are recognized as setbacks by Chinese Party members, but the explanation given is that these are the unavoidable minor mishaps on the long clear road ahead. Party members are told that the leadership in Afro-Asian countries where the Chinese have had failures is really bourgeois and so frightened of its own masses that the leaders dare not cut themselves off from "imperialist" support. Further, American subversion is credited with infiltrating the upper ranks in those countries but the prediction is that the masses will turn the leaders out and turn to China.

On the purge in China—was considered responsible

Miao said Party members have been given virtually no information on the behind-scenes struggle and know little more than what has been published. In his view, there is a combination of personal power struggle for the succession to Mao and policy conflict between extremists and moderates. Miao ranked Lin Piao as an extremist going perhaps a little beyond Mao.

The extremist-moderate division of opinion runs through all policies, foreign and domestic, he said. He thought it inconceivable that any group in Peking might urge moderation abroad and extremism at home, or vice versa. A sense of acute international tension is essential to the domestic policy of the extremists, he said, so that the answer to complaints about China's low living standards can be the charge of undermining the cause of world revolution. Miao said he thought China's domestic problems were much worse than Russia's had been at the very worst of the Stalin period. The extremists now have the upper hand.

Peng Chen, the former mayor of Peking, now disgraced, had been designated by Mao to make the "cultural revolution" but appears to have used his position instead to protect his opponents. Peng has been officially called a "smiling tiger," a Chinese expression for two-facedness. He was considered responsible

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for an article called "The Three Villages," written by three men under a pseudonym, which rebutted the Mao thesis that culture can exist only to serve the revolution and any other thoughts pressed, however neutered, must be considered anti-revolutionary.

Party members have been told that Peng had great ambitions and that his ultimate aim was to usurp all party, military and state power.

On Stalin—Criticism of Stalin inside China is now considered as disguised criticism of Mao. Chinese Party members are generally not aware of the fierce quarrel and overall bad relations between Stalin and Mao during the Soviet dictator's lifetime.

Miao said that it took him about a week from the time he definitely decided to defect until he had a chance to duck out of the Chinese Embassy in Damascus. He went straight to the U.S. Embassy because, he said, "I am convinced that the United States is the strongest country in the Free World." That too he had learned from the Party.

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cribes on position